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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE PROSPECT
FOR DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA
C IF F. R. A. WILiAms t
INTRODUCTION

Today, many objective observers would agree that there is a
real need, almost everywhere in Africa, for a system of government
which will guarantee economic prosperity, full employment, social
justice and fundamental liberties for all. After the Second World
War, world opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of putting an end
to the system of colonial rule and by the early 1960's the British, the
French and the Belgians had granted independence to their former
colonial territories in Africa and elsewhere. The British, more than
the others, did their best to lay a solid foundation for independence
and they made some effort, before relinquishing power, to see that
their former colonial territories were provided with a constitution
modeled after their own parliamentary system. These "Made in
England" constitutions have had a very high mortality rate. Their
average life span is about five years; it is exceptional for any of them
to survive for ten years in a form recognizable as that which the
British handed over on the date of independence. But, in fairness,
the fault is not entirely that of our former colonial masters. In every
case, the British tried to see that the constitution reflected, as far as
possible, the agreement of the political leaders of the territory concerned. Bearing this in mind, it is probably more realistic to place
greater blame on ourselves for the inadequacies of our constitutions
at the time of independence.
I should define the scope of this lecture at the earliest possible
stage. Africa has many political problems which involve the search
for a just and stable government. There is the struggle for independence of the people of the remaining colonial territories administered by Portugal and Spain. There is also the struggle taking place
in the Union of South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia, where
Africans whose skins happen to be dark are fighting for equal civil
and political rights along with their fellow citizens whose skins happen
* This article is a reprint of a speech delivered at the University of Pennsylvania
as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture on March 14, 1967.
t President, Nigeria Bar Association. B.A., 1943, M.A. 1946, Cambridge University. Member, English and Nigerian Bars.
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to be white. This lecture is not concerned primarily with these problems, important and vital though they are to the future of the continent. I am more concerned with the constitutional problems of the
new African states. I am concerned with the causes of dissatisfaction
with the constitutions that came into being upon independence and
the possibility of devising new constitutions capable of ensuring stable,
virile and popular governments while safeguarding the fundamental
rights and liberties of citizens. All these problems, however, are not
entirely unconnected. Those who defend Portuguese and Spanish
colonialism in Africa or advocate white supremacy in South Africa
and Rhodesia, frequently point to the failure of the governments of
the new African states to provide stable and incorruptible administration and to the apparent suppression or complete disregard of
fundamental individual rights in those territories. They argue that
such failures show what will inevitably follow the granting of independence to the remaining colonial territories or the concession of
equality of political rights to black African majorities in places where
white minority rule presently obtains. These arguments can be
answered effectively only if the political leaders in the new African
states can find a lasting solution to the political and constitutional
problems that face them today. As I have neither the knowledge nor
the time to deal with all the new African states in detail, I hope I
shall be forgiven for taking refuge in my own country, Nigeria.
Nigeria, as a political unit, like other colonial territories in Africa,
was the creation of the colonial power which administered it. Prior
to European colonial incursion into Africa, there was no political unit
corresponding to what is known today as Nigeria. Nigeria was a
creation of the British Colonial Administration which brought together into one political entity a large number of communities many
of which were warring against each other, and were at varying stages
of development, with differing political and social organizations. They
had nothing in common except that they were administered as one
country by the British. Therefore, when the time came for the British
to hand over power to the Nigerians, power was handed over to authorities who had no claim to the loyalties of the various peoples that
made up Nigeria, except that they were the legitimate successors of
the former British rulers. On the other hand, there can be no doubt
that, by the time British rule came to an end in Nigeria, the Nigerians
had become aware of the advantages of remaining together as a single
political unit. There was, therefore, an element of consent in the idea
of building a nation that would owe allegiance to those entrusted with
the powers of a central government. Somehow the system which was
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so carefully thought out did not produce the expected results; widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the politicians eventually led to the Army take-over in January 1966.
It would be outside the scope of this lecture to dwell too long
on the political events that led to the Army take-over. I am more
concerned with examining what were, in my opinion, the main causes
of the failure of the government prior to the take-over by the Army.
Let me say for the benefit of those who may not be familiar with it,
that the Constitution adopted by Nigeria on independence was of the
federal type. It is similar to the United States Constitution in its
division of legislative and executive powers between the federal and
regional or state governments, as well as in its guarantees of fundamental rights by constitutional provisions. However, the structure
of the executive government and the relationship between the executive
and the legislature is modeled on the British parliamentary system.
The judiciary is assigned a similar role as that assigned to the judiciary
(or perhaps I should say as your judiciary has assumed) under the
United States Constitution. There is, however, a very important
difference between our judiciary and your own which I will mention
hereafter in connection with the interpretation of the Bill of Rights,
known to us as Provisions for Fundamental Rights.
The exact form of the constitution which Nigeria will eventually
adopt is yet to be finally determined. The Army leaders have stated
from time to time that a constitution will not be imposed upon the
people and that no constitution will come into force until it is ratified
by the people in one form or another. Communal clashes resulting in
bloodshed have temporarily slowed progress in this direction. It is
possible that these clashes, which have resulted in loss of life and
human suffering on a fairly wide scale, will have a permanent effect
on the thinking of our people about the final shape of the constitution.
It is, therefore, impossible to predict the final form of the constitution
with any degree of certainty. However, there is no dispute among
intellectual leaders in the country that the Nigerian Constitution must
be based on democratic principles and that it must guarantee fundamental rights and individual liberties.
In order to appreciate fully the nature of our political problems,
one must bear in mind the fact that Nigeria consists of several nationalities, popularly referred to as "tribes." The word "tribe" is bound
to be misleading because the populations of some of these so-called
"tribes" are larger than those of a number of small countries which
exist today as sovereign states. These nationalities differ from one
another in cultural traditions, social organization and language to a
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far greater extent than the nations of Europe differ one from another.
To the outsider, these differences are obscured by the habit of referring
to us as "Africans," or even simply as "Nigerians." The truth of the
matter is, that apart from English, we have no language which can be
regarded as the lingua franca nor which is used as a means of communication between members of different communal groups. The
only exception is the Hausa language which is spoken fairly widely in
Northern Nigeria. There are no indigenous religions common to
Nigerians other than Islam and Christianity. Curiously enough, it
seems that, at least on the political, linguistic and religious levels,
foreign influences have promoted unity among the various nationalities in Nigeria.
Consequently, the situation in Nigeria presents the same type of
problems, albeit on a more complex scale, as those which have bedevilled Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and English- and
French-speaking communities in parts of Canada. No constitution is
likely to be acceptable to the country or prove to be workable unless it
takes into account the existence of various nationalities in the country.
The constitution should also assuage the fear of minorities that the
powers of government may be used against their communal interest.
The present Army regime in Nigeria has not yet succeeded in setting up
the necessary machinery for ascertaining the views of the people about
the constitution. There have been, and may yet be, setbacks in their
efforts to do so, but I believe that ultimately the necessary machinery
will be set up. When that time comes, the question of whether
Nigeria should continue as a single political entity, or perhaps in a
looser federation than we had prior to January 1966, will have to be
considered. While it may be impossible at this stage to prophesy what
will eventually happen insofar as the form of the constitution is concerned, one can say quite definitely that there is an overwhelming
desire everywhere in Nigeria for a democratic way of life. Nothing
that has happened in recent months has really shaken the faith of
thinking people in Nigeria on this point. And so I think it is time
that I proceed to examine the essentials of a democratic society. I
propose to do this because, while a democratic constitution can take a
variety of forms, there are certain basic principles which must be
present in all.
The Essentials of a Democratic Society
It may be considered presumptuous on my part to delay you on
this aspect of my lecture. After all, it was here in America that the
classical definition of democratic government was first pronounced.
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But, it is important, in the light of our experiences in Nigeria, that
we remind ourselves of the basic principles of democracy. In the
past, we from the developing nations of Africa have paid far too
much attention to the forms and structure of constitutions and not
enough to their substance. We have assumed too easily that structural
arrangements which ensure the maintenance of basic principles of
democracy in America or the United Kingdom will adequately serve
the same purpose in Africa.
In the final analysis, a democratic society is one in which those
who rule are answerable to and govern with the consent of those who
are ruled. This implies that the people are entitled to choose those,
who will make laws to order their affairs, to define the scope and
extent of their authority, to prescribe the machinery for checking abuses
or excesses of power and to criticize and bring legitimate pressure to
bear upon those who rule them. In short, the executive and legislative
authority of the state in a democratic society must be elected.
Experience in most democratic countries has taught us that those
who are entrusted with the powers of government often have an
almost irresistible temptation to forget the true source of their authority
and to encroach upon individual rights and liberties to an extent which
is not warranted by the situation with which they are dealing. For
this reason, provisions are found in the constitutions of most democratic states which are designed to protect the fundamental rights and
liberties of citizens against unwarranted encroachment by the government. There are a few nations, such as the United Kingdom, where
the tradition among those entrusted with power is such that public
opinion, or the opinion of certain professional and other associations,
is a sufficient guarantee against abuses or excesses of power. In any
event, it is essential in a democratic society to ensure that fundamental
rights and liberties, such as the right of free speech and assembly and
the right of freedom from arbitrary arrest, are not limited at the whim
or caprice of the government of the day. I will return to this subject
when I discuss the method adopted under the Nigerian Constitution
for guaranteeing fundamental rights. It is sufficient to say at this
point that in Nigeria, as in this country and India, we have adopted
the method of inserting relevant provisions in the constitution.
The last, but by no means the least, basic element of a democratic
society is an independent and impartial judiciary. In Nigeria this
raises very difficult problems, not only in regard to appointment of
judges and other judicial officers, but also of ensuring that the
various communities in the country have confidence in their impartiality. At the time of independence, in October 1960, power to

1078

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.115:1073

appoint judges was vested in a Judicial Service Commission. There
was one Judicial Service Commission for the Federation and one
for each of the regions. Each Commission was presided over by its
respective Chief Justice and consisted almost entirely of other judges.
The only "outsider" was the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. This arrangement continued until 1963 when the Judicial
Service Commissions were abolished. Power to appoint judges for
the Federation was then vested in the Prime Minister, and for the
regions in their Premiers. Under the 1960 Constitution, the removal
of judges could be effected only after holding a Tribunal of Enquiry
into allegations of misconduct by the judge and then if, on studying
the matter further, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council advised Her Majesty the Queen in England that the judge should be
removed from office for such misconduct. This procedure for removal
was altered by the Republican Constitution of 1963, which provides
that judges are removable from office upon presentation to the Head of
State of an address by a majority of at least two-thirds of all the
members of each House of the Legislature, praying that the judge in
question be removed on the ground either of inability to discharge
the functions of his office or of proven misbehaviour.
There is always a risk, in any democratic society, in vesting the
power to appoint judges and other judicial officers in the government
of the day, or in a single member thereof. Wherever such an arrangement has worked, it has been preceded by a history of highly irregular,
unmeritorious or even scandalous appointments, until public or professional opinion, by constant criticism and protests, has built up a
satisfactory tradition or convention. It is widely known that until
the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, political party
considerations weighed very heavily in judicial appointments to the
High Court of Justice in England.' Considering our local circumstances, I, personally, do not think it is possible for us in Africa to
copy successfully the method of appointing judges employed in the
United States, the United Kingdom or any other democratic state.
' When the office of Master of the Rolls fell vacant in 1897, Lord Salisbury, the
Prime Minister, wrote a letter to Lord Halsbury, the Lord Chancellor, in which he
pressed the claims to that office of Sir Edward Clarke, a member of the Tory Party,
referring to "the unwritten law of our party system." HEusTox, LiVEs OF THE Lo D
He continued:
CHAwCF.LORS 1885-1940, at 52 (1964).
[T]here is no clearer statute in that unwritten law than the rule that party
claims should always weigh very heavily in the disposal of the highest legal
appointments. In dealing with them you cannot ignore the party system as
you do in the choice of a general or an archbishop. It would be a breach of
the tacit convention on which politicians and lawyers have worked the British
Constitution together for the last 200 years. Perhaps it is not an ideal system
-some day no doubt the M.R. [Master of the Rolls] will be appointed by
competitive examination in Law Reports, but it is our system for the present:
and we should give our party arrangements a wrench if we throw it aside.
Ibid.
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An independent and impartial judiciary can only function properly
with the assistance of a vigorous and fearless body of professional
lawyers and advocates who are ready to give assistance to all classes
of people without regard to communal pressures or prejudice. This
is of particular importance in my country where occasions may arise
in which, whether rightly or wrongly, a considerable section of the
public will view the issues to be contested in those cases as involving
a clash of communal interests. In such cases an advocate may be
required to plead the cause of someone who is supposedly antagonistic
to the interests of the advocate's own community, and he must be able
to resist undue pressure aimed at interfering with the discharge of his
professional duties and obligations. The position of a Nigerian judge
is no more enviable in such situations, unless (which is hardly ever
the case) he does not belong to either of the communities whose interests are supposedly involved in the litigation. In this kind of
situation, the long tradition and professional code of ethics of lawyers
in all common law countries are far more effective than any constitutional guarantee.
Guarantees of Fundamental Rights
Under the Nigerian Constitution
As I have already stated, it is common practice to have express
provisions in the constitution which guarantee fundamental rights.
But these rights are subject to limitations, and in any democratic
society it is sometimes permissible for the authorities to restrict their
full exercise in the interest of public security, safety, morality and
health, or in the interest of the reputation of others. Broadly speaking, the United States Constitution has left it to the judiciary to work
out the extent of permissible limitation of fundamental rights. However, your courts have been concerned about the extent to which they
can define the scope of permissible restriction and, in a case dealing
with freedom of speech,? Mr. Justice Frankfurter, of your Supreme
Court, has said:
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of
the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.
Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which
compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs to
the Congress 3
2

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

3Id. at 525 (concurring opinion).
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It seems obvious that, if the definition or delimitation of permissible
restriction of fundamental rights were left entirely to the judiciary,
the risk of conflict with the legislature would be heightened. While
a well-established democratic society can withstand the storms and
stresses of such a conflict, it would be dangerous to expect the same
result in a developing democratic society, and particularly in a young
nation with the complex problems present in the Nigerian situation.
Accordingly, when provisions for fundamental rights were first introduced into the Nigerian Constitution, there was a deliberate policy of
defining as closely as possible, in the Constitution itself, the scope of
permissible restriction of those rights. It was hoped that the judiciary
in Nigeria would thus be saved from the embarrassment of being
accused of usurping the functions of the legislature, since its work
would be confined solely to interpreting the Constitution. I am by
no means certain that we succeeded in achieving our objective. In
the attempt to define the scope of permissible restriction, the exceptions to the rights appeared to take up more space than the rights
themselves, and a lawyer in this country, looking at the text of our
Constitution, is reputed to have remarked that it was not a Bill
of Rights but a Bill of Exceptions! A more serious difficulty is that
we have qualified the rights in many places by reference to undefined
standards of political behavior in other democratic societies. The
phrase which occurs again and again is "nothing in this section shall
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, etc., etc." It
seems on the face of it that we are back at the point from which we
took flight. I do not see how a Nigerian court can decide whether or
not a particular law conforms to the prescribed standards without
exercising some judgment of a political nature.
The only case in which, to my knowledge, the Nigerian Supreme
Court has considered the problem is Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Chike Obi.4 In that case the validity of sections 50 and 51 of the
Nigerian Criminal Code, which made provision for the offense of
sedition, was attacked on the ground that it was in conflict with the
constitutional provision for freedom of expression. The Court took
a view which is of some interest and it would be best for me to quote
from the opinion of Federal Justice Brett, with whom Federal Justice
Unsworth concurred. After remarking that "the courts should remember that their function is to decide whether a restriction is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, and not to impose their own
views on what the law ought to be," Federal Justice Brett continued:
4

[1961] All N.L.R. 186.
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In considering the correct judicial approach, the Supreme
Court of India said, in State of Madras v. Row (1952),
S.C.R. 597 -- "In evaluating such elusive factors and forming
their own conception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the social
philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating
in the decision should play an important part, and the limit
to their interference with legislative judgement can only be
indicated by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint
and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not
only for people of their own way of thinking but for all, and
that the majority of the elected representatives of the people
have, in authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable."
In similar vein Holmes, J., delivering the judgement of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Missouri, Kansas
and Texas Railroad v. May (1904), 194 U.S. 267, a case
concerning the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws said :-"It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the Courts."
Mr. Justice Brett then stated that although sections 50 to 52 of
the Nigerian Criminal Code were enacted in 1942 when there was
not even a representative legislature in Nigeria, it was significant that
in 1960 a representative legislature enacted as part of the Penal Code
of Northern Nigeria a section dealing with sedition in substantially
similar terms to sections 50 and 51 of the Nigerian Criminal Code.
He concluded that:
[W]e have to approach sections 50 and 51 of the Criminal
Code not merely as part of the legacy of a former regime
but as something of which an equivalent has been considered
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society by the majority
of the elected representatives of the people of the Federation.
This does not in any way relieve the Court of the duty to
judge for itself, but it is among the matters to be taken into
consideration.'
With respect, I doubt if the opinion that I have just quoted
would be of assistance in cases in which the enactment of a popularly
elected legislature is being challenged. It does suggest, however, that
the courts would be reluctant to upset any enactment alleged to have
infringed upon fundamental rights on the ground that it is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It is obvious that any such
5 Id. at 197-98.
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decision on the part of a court would at once result in a conflict with
the legislature. It is pertinent to recall that the Commission which
recommended the inclusion of fundamental rights in the Nigerian
Constitution had its own reservations about the extent to which such
rights could be enforced. The Commission, after strongly recommending in its report that suitable provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights be included in the Nigerian Constitution, went on
to state:
Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult to
enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless,
we think they should be inserted. Their presence defines
beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides
a standard to which appeal may be made by those whose
rights are infringed. A Government determined to abandon
democratic courses will find ways of violating them but they
are of great value in preventing a deterioration in standards
of freedom and the unobtrusive encroachment of a Govern6
ment on individual rights.
The Commission would appear to regard political sanctions as
providing a more effective guarantee of fundamental rights than
court proceedings. Our experience in Nigeria can hardly be said
to have justified the pious hopes of the Commission in regard to the
efficacy of extra-judicial sanctions. It must be conceded, however,
that in advising their various governments on projected legislation,
the law officers would no doubt draw attention to any glaring inconsistency with the provisions of the Constitution, including those
providing for fundamental rights.
Let me give one example of the way in which a provision for
fundamental rights can be ignored with apparent impunity. There
has been, for some years, in Nigeria a very wide gap in educational
achievement between Southern Nigeria (which is relatively more
advanced) and Northern Nigeria (which is relatively backward). The
federal government felt that it would be embarrassing if nearly all
segments of the Federal Public Service were manned by Southerners
who, in terms of overall population, are outnumbered by the
Northerners. Yet, this must inevitably be the result if uniform
standards of qualification are required for admission into the Public
Service of the Federation. Many of us will agree that it is desirable,
given present circumstances, to make the Federal Public Service not
only Nigeria-wide in name but also in "look." As a result, the federal
government decided to apply lower standards of qualification to
6

Report of the Minorities Commission 97 (1958).
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candidates from Northern Nigeria for purposes of admission to the
Public Service. This policy is, I think, in direct conflict with the
provisions of section 28 of the Nigerian Constitution which guarantees freedom from discrimination. Section 28 expressly provides
that a citizen of Nigeria shall not be accorded any privilege or
advantage that is not conferred on other Nigerian citizens merely
because he belongs to a particular community, tribe, place of origin,
etc. The policy has never been challenged in the courts, but even
if it had been challenged, and the challenger had been able to get
over the difficulty of establishing his locus standi to bring the proceedings, I doubt if success would have produced any effective results. The
qualifications for admission to the Federal Public Service might very
well have been lowered and the policy continued without the fanfare
of a public statement!
It would seem that in the long run, there is considerable validity
in the view that public opinion and the willingness of those in
authority to respect fundamental rights are the only ultimate guarantees against undue encroachment upon individual freedom and
liberty. It must be recognized that, although the courts have an
important role to play in safeguarding the civil and political rights
of the individual, there is a necessary limit to the power and authority
of the courts in this connection. Time is needed to allow the democratic system to take root and grow in Nigeria, as has been true elsewhere, before safeguards for individual freedom can properly function.
The courts in Nigeria, deriving their tradition from the role of
the British judiciary, naturally tend to take a restricted view of their
function in regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights and the
Constitution of Nigeria. Consequently, it is unlikely that they will
ever be persuaded to nullify an enactment of the legislature on the
ground that the particular legislation is not reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society. I have spoken about the risk of the judiciary
being accused of usurping the function of the legislature if it exercises
its function of enforcing fundamental rights, or if it declares that a
statute is void on the ground of inconsistency with the Constitution.
In Nigeria, and I think in other nations of Africa generally, the
strain of such conflict will be heightened by the fact that the politicians
in control of the machinery of government are inclined to be very
sensitive about their new powers and to resent any interference (real
or imaginary) with the exercise of those powers. The situation is
likely to be more highly charged whenever the bulk of the judiciary
is composed of non-Africans, particularly nationals of the former
colonial power. It is easy to regard the nullification of legislation in
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such cases not merely as the usurpation of legislative function by the
judiciary, but rather as a continuation of interference by "outsiders"
with the exercise of national sovereignty or the expression of the will
of an independent state.
The reaction almost everywhere in Africa has been for the
politicians to seek greater control over the appointment of judges and
judicial officers in the hope that they can pack the bench with people
who are likely to exercise a more favorable judgment whenever
executive or legislative actions are challenged in the law courts. Our
experience in Nigeria is that this method has, on the whole, failed
to produce the results for which the politicians have hoped. This,
of course, is due to the traditions and integrity of the bar from which
judicial appointments are made. Professor D. V. Cowen, writing
with special reference to South Africa, has said something in this
connection which, I think, is probably also true of the rest of the
continent:
We must not discount the force of legal training and professional tradition. It must not be forgotten that even
though appointments are sometimes made to the Bench because of the political antecedents of the appointees, nevertheless when these men go on the Bench they take with them
the restraints of their legal training and they cannot entirely
ignore the professional opinion of their colleagues-on the
Bench, at the Bar, at the Side-Bar, and in the universities.
There are stories attributed to both the late Mr. Tielman
Ross and the late Mr. Oswald Pirow (when they were
Ministers of Justice in previous South African governments)
about certain South African judges whose appointments were
made on political grounds; and the Ministers found to their
chagrin that the particular judges then proceeded to give decisions against the government that appointed them. "The
trouble about these judges," said Ross and Pirow, "is that
they get delusions of grandeur. Having acquired security
of tenure, they imagine that they were appointed on merit !"
There are, in fact, numerous cases in the history of the United
States Supreme Court where appointments, obviously political
in character, have proved to be completely impartial, the
judges in question frequently giving judgment against the
administration that appointed them.'
The Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria
After the Army take-over in January 1966, it was quite apparent
that the overwhelming majority of Nigerians felt the need for a
radical change in the system of government to which they had been
7 COWEN, Tm FOUNDATIONS OF

FRaom 151-52 (1961).
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accustomed immediately before and after independence in October
1960. The main problem now is to devise a constitutional arrangement which will avoid the most patent abuses of the old regime. At
the present time there are fears about the continued association of all
the regions of Nigeria as one country. Because of the requirements
of public security, Parliament remains suspended, political parties are
banned and there is no civilian government. The country is administered on the basis of the 1963 Constitution, subject to such modifications as are made necessary by the fact that there is no legislature and
no elected executive or legislative authority. Yet, it is believed, everywhere in the country, that the present arrangement is only temporary
and that a democratic Constitution will in due course be fashioned.
Much thought is being given to the form the new Constitution might
take. Many people feel that some of the difficulties of the past regime
can be traced to the close association between the executive authority
and the legislature. This followed the pattern of the British parliamentary system. As a result of this arrangement, elections to the
legislature were fought very fiercely since membership in the legislature
was regarded as the first step towards appointment as Premier,
Minister, or Parliamentary Secretary. If a political party won an
election with a small majority, its ranks in the legislature usually were
increased quickly by people seeking jobs as Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries in the executive government. The arrangement
was such that the really ambitious among those who sought election
did so not because they were interested in legislative work but because
they were seeking appointment as members of the executive government. Nigerian experience further shows that if there is a crisis
within the party in control of the majority of the legislature, any
resulting instability will affect both the legislative, and the executive
arms of the government at the same time. This, indeed, is what happened in Western Nigeria in 1962 when the party to which the
Premier belonged lost confidence in him and sought to move a vote
in the legislature seeking his removal as Premier. I, myself, firmly
believe that there should be a complete separation of the executive
from the legislature under the Nigerian Constitution in order to
avoid most of the difficulties to which I have referred.
No consideration of the prospects of democracy in Nigeria or, for
that matter, in any of the new African states, can be complete without
a discussion of the role of political parties. The recent fashion among
some of our political leaders has been to advocate a one-party state
as more suitable for African conditions. Nigeria, however, has become
accustomed to the existence of competing political parties contesting
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regional and national elections. Unless there are compelling reasons
to the contrary, it would, in my view, be unwise to set up a one-party
system. Experience shows that, whenever a one-party system has
been established, it has originated in the desire of a particular party to
perpetuate its dominance of the country. One of the arguments made
in support of a one-party system in a developing country is that it
avoids the dissipation of the limited number of talents in the country.
This argument assumes that the only arena for the exercise of talent
is within the government or the governing party. I believe that in
Nigeria, and in the new nations of Africa in general, there is a good
deal of room for talent not only within but also outside the government
and the governing party. It is also argued that a single party provides
more stable government. In reality what is meant is that the elimination of all opposition gives the appearance of stability to the government. I think that, in the wider interests of any democratic state,
there should be avenues for public criticism of the government and its
administration and these cannot be effectively maintained under a
one-party system. It is a short step from having a one-party system
to insisting that public criticism of the government and its administration by ordinary citizens should be prohibited. Otherwise, the
government would be affording to ordinary citizens a right which it
must of necessity deny to members of the governing party.
Political parties, in normal circumstances, perform very useful
functions in a democratic society. They provide a forum for discussing matters affecting the nation and for formulating opinions.
Often they take the lead in arousing the public to matters of national
concern which might otherwise pass unnoticed. Party political rivalry
compels the party temporarily holding the reins of power to avoid
doing things which the opposition might seize upon to discredit it
before the electorate. To this extent, the existence of an opposition
party is in the public interest and indeed there cannot be a true
democracy without an opposition party. However a de facto one-party
system is as bad as a de jure one-party system. Experience shows
that the chances of an "independent" candidate winning an election
are very slim. Therefore, if the opposition party is weak or passes
out of existence, a virtual monopoly of all elected offices by the only
surviving party will result. It is therefore vitally necessary, in the
developing nations of Africa, where the tree of democracy is still
young and will require cultivating for many years to come, that something be done to see that political parties which have established substantial support in the country do not die out because they lack sufficient money to finance their activities. Questionable methods have
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been employed in obtaining money to finance political parties. Nearly
all the parties controlling the government have resorted to the practice of inflating contract prices and collecting the excess from the
contractors for payment to party funds. Another method is to award
contracts only to those contractors who are prepared to contribute an
agreed percentage of the contract price to party funds. Nothing stops
the politicians who actually handle the money before it reaches the
party treasury, from helping themselves in the process of helping their
political parties. Another method, perhaps less fraudulent, but equally
indefensible, is for the party in power to promote a private company
which has practically unlimited access to the receipt of public funds
by way of loans with easy repayment terms. The company then
makes generous grants to the political party. There can be no doubt
that these practices ought to be stopped. It would, however, be a
serious mistake to overlook the financial problems of political parties
in developing countries or the need to see that parties in such countries
do not die out simply because they cannot find money to lawfully
finance activities.
This problem has been faced in democratic states such as Puerto
Rico and the Federal Republic of Western Germany. The legislation
in force in Puerto Rico provides that the principal political parties are
entitled to receive from the government an annual grant of 75,000
dollars in non-election years and 150,000 dollars in election years.
Detailed regulations ensure that the monies are spent in meeting the
lawful expenses of the party. The law itself defines what qualifies a
political party for the status of a "principal political party" entitled
to receive grants. I fervently hope that the principle of giving financial
assistance to political parties will be accepted in Nigeria. I have no
doubt that some suitable formula could be found for the award of
such assistance. This would certainly reduce the incidence of corrupt
or questionable activities on the part of the party in control of the
machinery of government. Such activities have done a great deal to
bring governments into contempt and ridicule, both inside and outside
Africa.
Before leaving the question of political parties, I must mention
one problem to which I have already referred in passing and which
has tended to bring the multi-party system into ill repute both in
Nigeria and in the other new states of Africa. This is the problem
of "carpet-crossing"-desertion of the political party on whose platform a member of the legislature has been elected. I think it is true
to say that in 99.9%o of the cases of "carpet-crossing," the crossing
is from the opposition to the government party. The reason, as I
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have noted, is because the "carpet-crossers" seek appointment in the
Executive arm of the government. This has, in turn, led to the
appointment of far more Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries
than the country can afford, mainly because of the desire to keep
"carpet-crossers" from crossing back. Indeed, in one of the regions
of Nigeria, prior to January 1966, all the members of the government
in the legislature held appointments either as Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries!
The problem of "carpet-crossing" is not easy to deal with.
Ultimately, the surest guarantee against such practices would be public
opinion. In dealing with this problem, one comes up against the
fundamental rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of association
and it would surely not be right to curtail the rights of members of
Parliament in this respect. Moreover, there still would remain those
persons who disagree with their party on matters of major policy and
who feel that they can no longer in good conscience continue to be
associated with the party. One suggested solution is to provide that,
when a member of Parliament resigns from his political party, his
seat in the legislature must be declared vacant so that his constituency
can decide whether or not they wish to continue to be represented by
him. One justification for this view is that the constituency elected
him on the ticket of his former political party in the first instance.
Finally, I would point out that the complete separation of the legislature from the Executive is bound to reduce the incentive to "carpetcrossing."
Quality of Leadership
Nigeria cannot hope to survive as a democracy unless it is able
to produce in the future leaders of high calibre to guide its affairs.
This is true of all countries. A constitutional system which fails to
produce the right type of leaders may well be regarded as inadequate
for the objective it was designed to achieve. On the other hand, the
constitution does not make the leaders. It merely lays down the
rules for their selection and the regulation of their conduct as trustees
of power within the State. A constitution, however perfect, cannot
be regarded as a computer for selecting the most capable leaders to
conduct the affairs of State. The democratic system ensures that the
selection shall be made by the people themselves and, in this sense, it
is with them that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring quality rests.
Any failure to choose persons of the right quality must therefore be
the fault of the voters and not of the constitution. The problem of
ensuring the selection of leaders of quality is, in my view, intimately
bound up with that of seeing to it that the electorate is given all
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possible help and facilities to exercise enlightened judgment on current
issues. This implies that developments in the field of education must
be accelerated and that the gap in educational advancement between
Northern and Southern Nigeria must be narrowed and ultimately
removed.
However, a constitution should ensure, as far as it is humanly
possible to do so, that tendencies or activities which are likely to work
against national interest, the stability of the government and the maintenance of principles of justice and fair play, are effectively checked.
The actual machinery for accomplishing this must be specifically designed for the country concerned; otherwise, it will not function
properly. In a plural society, such as Nigeria, constant attention must
be paid to inter-community and inter-tribal relations and causes of
friction and hostility must be identified and cured. It may well be
that this kind of exercise will require the creation of some institutional
arrangement free from political direction or control but dedicated to
the promotion of national unity and the fostering of national loyalties.
In the new nations of Africa, and certainly in Nigeria, I think the
problem deserves special study and attention at the national level.
Conclusion
that
the
task of devising a satisfactory constituI am convinced
tion for the purpose of establishing a democratic system of government
in the new and developing states of Africa is not beyond human
ingenuity. In undertaking that task, a good deal will be learned from
the experience, the successes and the mistakes, of the older democracies.
Above all, we learn a great deal from our own experiences and from
the mistakes that have brought us to the position where we are today.
The process of finding a solution is not going to be smooth and one
must not develop undue pessimism as a result of political crises,
revolutions or breakdowns in the machinery of government. However
distressing some of these events may be, they should be regarded as
necessary evils in the process of educating the general public. The
events which led to the downfall of the Nkruma regime in Ghana may
have been the most effective way of demonstrating the fact that the
over-concentration of power in the hands of one man is not the right
solution for the problem of establishing stable government in African
countries. Similarly, the idea of establishing a one-party state in
Sierra Leone almost became a reality and was only abandoned in the
face of an abortive revolution. 8 Arbitrary arrests, unjust imprison8 A successful revolution in fact later took place in Sierra Leone after this lecture
was delivered. Its immediate cause was a dispute as to whether the Governor General
had acted rightly in calling upon the leader of opposition to form the government after
the 1967 general elections.

1090

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.115:1073

ments, unwarranted suppression of freedom of speech and other out-

rages on the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual may
cause a good deal of suffering and distress to the victims and their
relatives, but they also arouse public sympathy and disturb the conscience of many influential sections of the public inside and outside
the country affected, to an extent which is never realized by those
in authority. If these things do not occur at some stage in the
history of a nation, it may well be that it has missed a vital and
important political experience.
The success of Nigeria and other developing states of Africa in
establishing stable democratic systems of government is bound to
lead not only to greater economic prosperity and happiness for their
people, but also to the effective silencing of the only remaining excuse
of the advocates of colonialism and white supremacy in Africa.

